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This paper shows that banking development spurs growth, even in a country with a 
high growth rate such as China. Employing data of 27 Chinese provinces over the 
period 1995-2003, we study whether the financial development of two different types 
of institutions – banks and non-bank financial institutions – have a (significantly 
different) impact on local economic growth. Our findings show that banks outperform 
non-bank financial institutions. Only banking development exerts a statistically and 
economically significant positive impact on local economic growth. This effect 
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  2I. Introduction   
 
Financial development plays an important role in promoting the growth of many 
countries. An under-researched question, however, is whether finance continues to be 
an important driver of growth in countries exhibiting high growth rates. In this paper 
we address this “finance-high-growth rate” question by studying the recent economic 
growth of Chinese provinces. China, being one of the most important developing 
countries in the world, exhibited an average real growth rate of about 9 percent per 
year during the last two decades. We do find that finance also matters for fast growing 
economies. 
 
In addressing the finance-high-growth rate nexus, we deal with the impact of different 
financial institutions – bank and non-bank financial institutions. Banks typically are 
state-owned, large, operate nationwide, and have many branches. Non-bank financial 
institutions, in contrast, operate locally within the province and are much smaller
1.  
Banks are generally technologically more advanced, better developed and dominate 
the financial system. Banks, however, are known for their reluctance to grant loans to 
small private companies (Allen et al., 2005 and Boyreau-Debray, 2002), while most 
non-bank institution loans are extended to the non-state-owned sector (Xie, 1998). 
Bank and non-bank financial institutions show clear differences calling for a separate 
treatment. Employing a generalized “difference-in-differences” method, we compare 
the impact of the development of bank and non-bank financial institutions on Chinese 
provinces’ growth rates over the period 1995-2003. Our results indicate that only bank 
loans exert a statistically and economically significant positive impact on local 
economic growth. The distinct performances of bank and non-bank financial 
institutions can mainly be attributed to the differences in their geographical scope, 
size and organization, and efficiency. However, we also find that the presence of 
non-bank financial institutions stimulates competition in the local banking market. 
Specifically, the positive impact of banks’ development on growth becomes more 
pronounced when the local financial sector is less concentrated. 
 
                                                        
1 Banks in our study include the five biggest commercial banks in China: the four biggest state-owned 
commercial banks and one national commercial bank, Bank of Communications. Non-bank financial 
institutions mainly include rural credit cooperatives, and local trust and investment companies. For the 
detailed differences between those institutions, we refer to the third section. 
  3The relationship between finance and growth has been debated for a long time. Recent 
cross-country studies provide evidence that greater financial development leads to 
higher growth (e.g. King and Levine (1993a), Levine and Zervos (1998), Berger, 
Hasan, and Klapper (2004); more details are in our literature review section). 
However, the evidence from cross-country regressions may be plagued by omitted 
variable problems, and therefore must be viewed with some skepticism (Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1996)). For example, cross-country differences in political institutions, 
accounting standards, and legal systems may drive both economic growth and 
financial development, but are not easily controlled for. 
 
Within-country studies suffer less from this problem and their inferences therefore 
should be more convincing. For instance, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) document that 
after the relaxation of bank branch restrictions in the United States, the growth in 
income and output increased significantly (see our literature review section for other 
studies). However, whether those inferences also apply to developing economies that 
are in a different phase of the growth path than the developed ones, is not clear.   
 
Direct evidence from developing economies on the finance-high-growth-rate nexus is 
scarce.
2 As China is one of the most important developing countries, China’s 
experience may be relevant also for other countries having the potential of exhibiting 
similar growth as China. The Chinese finance-growth nexus only recently received 
attention, but no consensus on the role of finance has been reached yet. One strand of 
papers argues that financial development matters for economic growth by observing 
that local growth is significantly correlated with financial development (e.g. Li and 
Liu (2001) and Zhou and Wang (2002)). Another strand of papers holds the opinion 
that China is a counterexample to the current findings of the finance and growth 
literature. For instance, Allen et al. (2005) conclude that there exist other financing 
channels for the private sector than those of financial institutions.   
 
Our paper provides new evidence and insights on the finance-high-growth rate nexus 
in China. Identifying the effects of financial development on economic growth is a 
challenging task in that financial development may react to the expectation of 
                                                        
2 An exception is Haber (1991, 1997) who documents that financial liberalization promotes growth in 
both Brazil and Mexico. 
  4enhanced future economic growth; hence economies with good growth prospects 
develop institutions to provide funds necessary to support those good prospects 
(Robinson (1952)). The Chinese case allows us to make progress in controlling for 
this reverse causality. First, the Chinese economy with its different types of financial 
institutions allows us to take a generalized “difference-in-differences” method, which 
helps us identify the causation. The rationale for this approach stems from the 
following reasoning. Theory argues that financial institutions efficiently allocate 
capital to where it can generate better returns and therefore promote growth. If this 
theory applies, banks with better efficiency relative to non-bank financial institutions 
may be better at selecting fast growing firms. Empirically we should observe a 
stronger correlation between bank development and future economic growth. 
However, if finance simply follows growth, the huge demand for funds from the 
non-state-owned enterprises due to their growing needs will make the development of 
non-bank financial institutions show a stronger correlation with future growth. 
 
Second, we choose the period over 1995-2003, immediately after the Chinese 
government tried to “soft land” the economy. The economic growth rates had shown a 
decreasing trend during our sample period. When economic growth leads finance, the 
situation should be less severe during the downswing of the business cycle. Typically, 
we find that the fastest growing provinces in our sample are not those that exhibit the 
greatest increase in financial development.   
 
Our findings highlight that banking development via bank loans exerts a significantly 
positive impact on local growth, both statistically and economically. As a comparison, 
non-bank financial institutions, while granting most of their loans to the 
non-state-owned sector, seem to be less important for local growth. This suggests that 
the efficiency of financial institutions still plays an important role in the allocation of 
funds, and in turn spurs growth. We find little evidence that fast growing provinces 
also had experienced a fast developing financial sector during our sample period. In 
conclusion, our results are less likely driven by reserve causality. 
 
How to reconcile these results with Allen et al. (2005), who argue that growth in 
China mainly stems from the private sector? First, Chinese banks may enjoy a better 
pool of borrowers as they have a larger geographical scope, face fewer restrictions in 
  5attracting deposits and therefore can establish stronger bank-firm relationships, and 
finance both large and small firms. Non-bank financial institutions may have a 
restricted choice due to their smaller nature. We notice that the state-owned sector still 
contributes around 40% of GDP growth in recent years (Sun, 2003). Banks therefore 
can easily allocate the capital to the most profitable state-owned enterprises. Second, 
bank loans and especially short-term loans to the non-state-owned sector, had grown 
considerably during our sample period. This suggests that banks increased their 
relative exposure towards the financing of private firms, even though most financed 
private firms were large ones. This noticeable change is also documented by two 
recent surveys (see Appendix), which indicate that Chinese banks are more likely to 
discriminate borrowers with respect to their sizes rather than ownership. Third, 
another plausible explanation is that bank loans may be transmitted to the private 
sector through state-owned enterprises. Lu and Yao (2004) argue that given the weak 
legal enforcement, Chinese banks may prefer to grant loans to state-owned enterprises 
that reinvest bank loans in the private sector.   
 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the finance 
and growth literature. Section III introduces the Chinese financial system, focusing on 
the two types of financial institutions. Section IV presents the effects of financial 
development on economic growth in China. The last section concludes. 
 
 
II Financial Development and Economic Growth: Theory and 
Evidence 
 
Theory has studied the relationship between finance and growth. In general there are 
two schools of thought with contrasting views. One school holds the idea that 
financial development follows rather than spurs economic growth. Robinson (1952) 
argues that finance does not cause growth, but reacts to the demand from the real 
sector. Hence economies with good growth prospects develop institutions to provide 
the necessary funds to support those good prospects. Some empirical evidence 
supports this idea. For instance, Shan and Morris (2002) study data from 19 OECD 
countries and China, and document that there is no clear evidence that finance 
  6Granger causes growth.   
 
The other school argues that financial development plays a key role for growth. First, 
financial intermediation economizes the costs associated with mobilizing savings 
(Boyd and Smith (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1995)), and therefore increases capital 
accumulation. Second, financial intermediation evaluates firms, managers and market 
conditions, and reallocates capital to its best use (Boyd and Prescott (1986), 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), or Allen (1990)). Moreover, financial 
intermediaries monitor firms and exert control to overcome agency problems 
(Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Boyd and Smith (1994)). Financial 
intermediation meanwhile diversifies investment risks, which enhances the output and 
in turn economic growth (Gurley and Shaw (1955), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)). In their view, differences in the quantity and 
quality of services provided by financial institutions partly explain why countries 
grow at different rates (Goldsmith (1969), Mckinnon, (1973), and Shaw (1973)). The 
recent literature also well integrates financial development in innovation-based 
growth models. For instance, King and Levine (1993a) suggest that financial 
intermediaries can evaluate, finance and monitor potential entrepreneurs in their 
innovative activities. They also show that the relationship between finance and growth 
is likely to be dynamic and endogenous. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkers (2003) 
show why the existence of technological transfers is not sufficient to put all countries 
on parallel long-run growth rate paths. They find that it is not just financial constraints 
that make some countries poor but rather that financial constraints inhibit a 
technological transfer and thus lead to an ever-increasing technology gap.   
 
Recent empirical evidence employing cross-country datasets document that finance is 
positively correlated with growth. King and Levine (1993a) use data on 77 countries 
over the period 1960-1989, to document that the level of financial development 
determines long-run economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth. 
Levine and Zervos (1998) refine this and find that initial stock market liquidity and 
banking development are both positively correlated with future rates of economic and 
productivity growth in a sample of 42 countries over the period 1976-1993.   
 
The initial cross-country studies, however, are likely to suffer from simultaneity bias. 
  7More recent studies therefore focus on finding proper instruments to extract the 
exogenous part of financial development when trying to settle the issue of causality. 
La Porta et al (1998) link the legal origin of a country to its financial development. 
Their empirical results suggest that a variety of legal origins (British, French, German 
or Scandinavian laws) differing in protecting the rights of both shareholders and 
creditors and in the efficiency of legal enforcement, reasonably lead to different levels 
of financial development. Based upon the above legal origin-finance instruments and 
using cross-country datasets, a substantial body of empirical work further shows that 
financial development promotes economic growth in aggregate, industry and firm 
level analysis (see e.g.  Levine, Loayza, and Beck, (2000) or Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998)). Next to instruments such as legal origin, economists also rely on 
improved econometric techniques to instrument endogenous variables. Authors 
employ the dynamic system GMM panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995), to extract the impact of financial development on economic growth by 
controlling for potential endogeneity.   
 
One way to control for cross-country differences such as legal origin is to focus on 
one country only. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) tackle the endogeneity problem by 
keeping effects other than financial development constant. They use financial 
deregulation in the early 1970s in 35 U.S.-states as an exogenous shock to local 
financial development. They find that in the 30 years after the deregulation, the 
economy grew faster in the deregulated states than in the other states. They also test 
the hypothesis of deregulation happening only due to expectation about the future 
needs of financing. They reject this hypothesis by observing that the loans after 
deregulation did not explode. Therefore, they attribute the relatively faster economic 
growth in the deregulated states to the improvements in loan quality. Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2004) study the effects of differences in local financial development on 
economic activity in Italy. They find that local financial development enhances the 
probability that an individual starts a business, increases industrial competition, and in 
turn spurs firm growth. 
 
Only few studies consider developing countries. Haber (1991, 1997) carefully 
examines the role of financial liberalization for economic growth in Brazil and 
Mexico. He documents that financial liberalization allows more firms to have better 
  8access to external finance. He argues that political institutions play an important role 
in determining the degree of financial liberalization, and concludes that Brazil did 
better in financial liberalization due to its better political institutions. 
 
The finance and growth issue in China has only received attention recently but no 
consensus has been reached yet. One strand of papers holds the view that finance 
promotes growth in China. Employing a province-level dataset for the period 
1985-1998, Liu and Li (2001) find that growth of provincial aggregate output is 
positively related to the growth of the loans of the largest banking institutions and self 
raised funds. They attribute the positive correlation to the improvement in the 
efficiency of capital reallocation during the liberalization in both financial and real 
sectors. Zhou and Wang (2002) study the impact of local financial development on 
economic growth, using a provincial dataset over the period 1978-2000, and find that 
local financial development is highly correlated with economic growth. Moreover, the 
provinces with relatively low initial level of financial development show slower 
growth rates afterwards. Particularly, they attribute the significant correlation between 
finance and growth to the openness of local financial markets, which improves the 
competition as well as the efficiency of financial institutions. However, those papers 
do not formally deal with the endogeneity of finance and growth and hence to some 
extent their conclusion of the causality is less convincing.   
 
The other strand of papers holds the opinion that China is a counterexample of the 
law-finance-growth nexus. More specifically, they question whether financial 
development plays an important role for China’s growth, as they observe the 
coexistence of weak Chinese legal and financial systems and fast economic growth. 
Allen et al. (2005) examine closely the relationship between law, finance and growth 
in China. Their analysis reveals that the relatively poor legal system and the 
underdeveloped financial sector contribute little to the growth of the private sector, 
which is known as the most important component of China’s fast growth. Hence, 
Allen et al. (2005) argue that there exist other financing channels for the private sector 
than those of financial institutions. 
 
 
  9III. The Chinese financial system   
 
3.1 The Chinese financial structure 
 
In this section, we offer a description of the Chinese financial structure.
3 We explicitly 
focus on the differently developed financial institutions in China – banks and 
non-bank financial institutions, rather than stock markets. The reasoning is that the 
Chinese financial system is dominated by financial institutions, especially banks.
4
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 presents the structure of the Chinese financial system at the end of 1994. It 
shows that financial institutions in China can be separated in two categories: banks 
and non-bank financial institutions. The banking sector (labeled as “banks”) entails 
three policy banks – focusing on policy-oriented loans – and fifteen commercial banks, 
of which the four state-owned commercial banks dominate the whole banking sector. 
Among the eleven national and regional banks, Bank of Communications
5 is the 
largest with China’s finance ministry the largest shareholder. Sometimes researchers 
refer to the four state-owned banks and the Bank of Communications as “the five 
biggest state-owned banks”. The non-bank financial sector consists of urban and rural 
credit cooperatives, trust and investment companies, financial companies and other 
institutions.  
 
We make a distinction between banks and non-bank financial institutions. Banks are 
hierarchically organized while non-bank institutions are generally following a 
“decentralized form”. This hierarchical structure mainly stems from their size. For 
example, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the largest state-owned bank has 
37,039 branches all over the country. As a comparison, there are only 50,745 rural 
credit cooperatives in the whole country. Also, a rural credit cooperative typically has 
                                                        
3 Table a1 in Appendix introduces the functions of the main Chinese financial institutions. 
4 For example, at the end of 1994, the ratio of the stock market capitalization to total assets of financial institutions 
was approximately 6.7%. Although the importance of stock markets has increased somewhat since the early 1990s, 
the scale and the importance of the financing channels of the stock markets are not comparable to those of 
financial institutions (Allen et al., 2005). In this paper, we assume that stock markets have no significantly 
different impacts on different provinces. Hence employing a fixed effects panel model and incorporating time 
dummy variable in our analysis may well control for the impact of stock markets.   
5 The Bank of Communications has been publicly listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange since June 2005.   
  10only one branch-office, does not belong to any “headquarter”, is independent from 
other rural credit cooperatives, and is active in one province only. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the total assets of the four state-owned banks, which were 
approximately 7,122 billion RMB
6 at the end of 1994, cover around 78 percent of the 
total assets of the entire financial sector. The other banks are relatively smaller. As the 
fifth biggest bank in China, Bank of Communications occupied more than half of the 
total assets of all national and regional banks at the end of 1994. The total assets of 
non-bank financial institutions together took 16 percent of the assets of all financial 
institutions. The market share of rural credit cooperatives was 7 percent, which was 
comparable to that of trust and investment companies. At the end of 2002, 
state-owned banks still dominated but their market share declined towards 68 percent. 
National and regional banks gained market share towards 15 percent. Market share of 
rural credit cooperatives increased whereas trust and investment companies’ market 
share decreased. 
 
We argue that the two types of financial institutions – banks and non-bank financial 
institutions – differ in several dimensions, and their financial development should 
therefore be treated separately. First, they have a diverging geographical scope. Banks 
are bigger players than non-bank financial institutions. Most banks in China are 
national or regional players, and some of them are even international players. A 
non-bank financial institution, in contrast, is typically present in one province only. 
Second, banks may be technological more advanced. Banks often pay higher salaries 
and offer better career opportunities to young graduates. Therefore, banks may attract 
higher quality personnel. Banks also benefit more easily from technological spillovers, 
as they recruit experts having overseas working experience. Third, large banks’ 
branches benefit from expert credit systems developed centrally. Although a 
hierarchical structure also has clear disadvantages and may imply a focus on hard 
information as argued by Stein (2002), banks in emerging countries may still benefit 
from such organizational structure as it helps in reducing asymmetric information 
                                                        
6  RMB=Renminbi (in 2000, 1 US $ = 8.3 RMB) 
  11problems. Stand-alone non-bank financial institutions are more likely to suffer from 
asymmetric information in the Chinese financial system. The reasoning is that there is 
no third-party credit rating agency.   
 
Recent balance sheet data as well as reported data on non-performing loans (NPLs) 
show that banks perform better than non-bank financial institutions. Tables 1 and 2 
offer more information. 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
 
Table 1 shows the operating costs of different types of Chinese financial institutions. 
The ratio of operating costs to assets is lower for banks than for non-bank financial 
institutions. Table 2 provides data on the non-performing loans (NPLs) in the Chinese 
financial sector. Although the average NPL ratio is high relative to other countries, 
banks have a lower NPL ratio than non-bank financial institutions. The numbers 
presented in Table 1 and 2 suggest that banks are more efficient than non-bank 
financial institutions. 
 
3.2 Bank-firm relationships in China 
 
Understanding the formation of bank-firm relationships in China may help us to gain 
insights into the role of finance for growth. As stock markets are not well developed 
in developing economies and emerging markets, firms heavily rely on debt, in 
particular short-term debt, for financing their investments. Hence the short-term loan 
portfolios of Chinese financial institutions may shed light on how different types of 
firms are financed. Figure 3 and Table 3 show how short-term credit has been 
allocated between two different types of firms, state-owned and non-state owned 
enterprises in China, during our sample period. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 and Table 3 here] 
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the short-term loan portfolios of financial institutions 
in China. Although both state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises 
received more short-term credit over the period 1994-2002, the short-term loans 
  12extended to the non-state-owned sector grew faster. Meanwhile the proportion of 
loans to the state-owned sector decreased from 82.5% in 1994 towards 64.4% in 2002. 
Data from BankScope show that the reporting banks’ growth rate of short-term loans 
was larger than the one of the reporting non-bank financial institutions (average 
annual growth rate of 6.6% versus 2.3% respectively over the period 1996-2002). 
This evidence taken together suggests that the growing short-term loans stem more 
from banks than from non-bank financial institutions. 
 
Furthermore, two surveys provide evidence on how firms may choose between 
different financial institutions (see Appendix: survey a1 and a2). They show that firms 
apply first for credit at banks before turning to non-bank financial institutions or other 
sources of finance. Hence, banks in China may enjoy a better pool of borrowers. The 
two surveys indicate also that at the end of 2002, banks in China are more likely to 
discriminate according to borrowers’ size rather than ownership. This may stem from 




IV. The growth effects of financial development in China 
 
4.1 Theoretical background, empirical model and financial development indicators 
 
4.1.1 Theoretical background 
 
Following King and Levine (1993b), we illustrate briefly how financial development 
affects technological innovation and hence possibly influences the long-run growth 
rate. Their endogenous growth model focuses on the connections between finance, 
entrepreneurship and economic growth. Financial institutions in this model play an 
important role in both the monitoring and financing of potential entrepreneurs, in their 
initiation of innovative activities, and launching of new products.   
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
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economic growth. Initially, in the entrepreneurial selection procedure, the financial 
intermediary monitors the whole set of candidates in the market and picks up potential 
entrepreneurs with the ability to manage innovations in the intermediate goods 
production technology. Second, the financial intermediary finances the innovative 
activities. If entrepreneurs are successful, they will enjoy monopoly profits by 
producing the unique intermediate product at a lower cost than their rivals but 
charging the same price. However, to produce intermediate goods the successful 
entrepreneurs need external financing. The financial intermediary evaluates and 
finances those entrepreneurs while it can pay back the consumers (savers) the interest 
according to its evaluation of the profitability of those entrepreneurs. Requiring the 
input of intermediate goods and labor, the production of final goods is also affected by 
the innovative success − the productivity increases with the technological progress. Of 
course, the aggregate final goods’ production influences the consumers, who also 
provide the labor in this model, by affecting their optimal choice of intertemporal 
substitution in consumption. Again, as most neo-classical models predict, the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity and time preferences of labor together with real 
return rates (interest rates in this model), are positively correlated with the aggregate 
growth. Moreover, the equilibrium conditions of the model show that the growth rate 
is not only affected by productivity, which is partly decided by the probability that a 
candidate is a potential entrepreneur, but also negatively impacted by the cost of 
monitoring. 
 
The model identifies the following potential relationships between finance and growth. 
First, finance supports innovations and hence increases the productivity which is 
positively correlated with growth. Second, efficiency improvements in the financial 
sector, such as a decrease in the cost of monitoring, will increase the real rate of return 
and thus lead to a higher future growth rate. Third, the model also suggests a reverse 
channel of causation where distortions in the innovative sector lower the demand for 
financial services and retard financial development.   
 
4.1.2 Empirical framework 
 
To estimate the impact of financial development on economic growth, consider a 
  14Cobb-Douglas production function at the individual level, 
, x k y
α =                               ( 1 )  
where y equals real per capita GDP, k equals real per capita physical capital stock, x 
equals other determinants of per capita growth, and α is a production function 
parameter. Taking the logarithm of (1) yields, 
 
. ln ln ln x k y + =α                           ( 2 )  
As most neo-classical R&D models predict, for example King and Levine (1993), the 
growth of x comes from technological innovation. First-difference of (2) yields, 
PROD GK GYP + = ) ( α , 
where GYP is the growth rate of real per capita GDP, GK is the growth rate of real per 
capita capital stock and PROD is the growth rate of everything else. If we assume that 
the hours worked per worker are relatively stable in our sample range, PROD should 
provide a reasonable conglomerate indicator of technology growth. If there is any key 
relationship between technological growth and financial development, for instance, 
efficiency, the contemporaneous impact of finance on growth hence can be estimated 
by, 
  12 to t t GPY a aGK a FI t ε = ++ +                   （3） 
where FIt is the financial development indicator at time t. For an empirical application 
of equation (3) to China’s local province growth, we base our estimation on panel data 
from different provinces over the period 1995-2003. The advantage of using panel 
data is that we can estimate the corresponding relationship even in a relatively short 
period. The fixed effects model derived from equation (3), also controlling for time 
effects can be written as   
,1 ,2 ,3 ,
11
IT
it it it it i i t t it
it
GPY a GK a FI a CON U V , δ φε
==
=+ + ++ + ∑∑  
where FIi,t is the financial development indicator of either banks or non-bank financial 
institutions in province i at time t. Ui is a set of province dummy variables, Vt is the 
set of time dummy variables, and  i δ  and  t φ  are the vectors of coefficients. CON 
refers to the conditioning informational set. CON  includes FDI and Investment 
measured by the ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP, and the ratio of total 
investment to GDP, respectively.   
 
  15In order to reveal the relationship between financial development and future economic 
growth, we introduce the lagged financial development indicators in our panel 
regression, 
 
,1 ,2 , 1 3 ,
11
IT
it it it it i i t t it
it
GPY a GK a FI a CON U V , δ φε −
==
=+ + ++ + ∑∑
7           ( 4 )  
Here equation (4) can be estimated by OLS in general, assuming that the lagged FI is 
exogenous and there is no heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the error 
term. However, problems arise when those assumptions are violated. For example, 
heteroskedasticity or serial autocorrelation in the error term is often observed in panel 
analysis. This problem can be solved by introducing robust standard errors or by first 
differencing the data. In our analysis, heteroskedasticity is detected. We report the 
results of regression (4) employing robust standard errors. 
 
Within country panel analysis alleviates the potential endogeneity problem that most 
cross-country studies may face. It is easier to control for omitted variables that may 
drive both economic growth and financial development. Reverse causality is another 
concern. The significant correlation between finance and growth may not necessarily 
indicate that finance spurs growth, but possibly the reverse. As we argued before, 
examining two types of financial institutions may also mitigate this problem. In 
several robustness tests, we also try to further deal with potential endogeneity 
problems.  
 
4.1.3. Bank and non-bank financial development indicators 
 
We construct three financial development indicators at province level for banks and 
non-bank financial institutions, respectively. 
 
Indicators of financial development of banks 
 
Bank Deposit equals the ratio of the savings in the banking system to local GDP. Bank 
                                                        
7 Here we control for the contemporaneous effects of conditioning variables, such as FDI and Investment, 
following the traditional finance and growth literature (see e.g. King and Levine (1993a)). As a robustness test, we 
also model the finance and growth relationship by controlling for the lagged value of conditioning variables, as 
conventional growth theory suggests. Our results remain robust. 
  16Deposit is a measure of “financial depth” of the local banking sector. A second 
indicator is Bank Credit, which equals the credit extended by banks to local 
enterprises over local GDP. This indicator measures the financial resources provided 
by banks to provincial entities. Finally, we construct a measure Bank Concentration, 
which represents the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), employing bank market 
shares in the deposit market and taking the province as the relevant market. We 
include this measure to proxy for the competitiveness of the banking sector. Before 
1980, there were only 3 banks in China and each of them enjoyed a different segment 
of the deposit market. After 1984, the number of banks in the market increased and 
banks began to compete for deposits under the permission of the central government. 
 
Indicators of financial development of non-bank financial institutions 
 
In a similar fashion as for the bank indicators, we construct Non-bank Deposit, 
Non-bank Credit and Non-bank Concentration for non-bank financial institutions. 
Descriptive statistics on all the development indicators are discussed in Section IV. 
 
A final variable we employ is Financial Concentration, computed as the HHI of the 
deposit market share of all financial institutions in our sample. It provides us with a 
global view of the concentration of the entire financial sector 
 
4.2 Data and empirical results 
 
4.2.1 Data Description 
 
Our dataset contains annual growth rates of real per capita GDP, real per capita capital 
stock, FDI and Investment in 27 provinces of China over the period 1995-2003
8. 
Lagged financial development indicators are also included in our dataset from 1994 to 
2002.  
 
The financial development indicators in our study are calculated employing the 
statistics data reported by Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking. The Almanac 
documents the provincial data of annual savings and loans of 5 banks only: 4 
                                                        
8 Data reasons prevent us to include three provinces (Hubei, Tibet and Hainan).   
  17state-owned banks and the Bank of Communications, the biggest bank of the national 
commercial banks. At the end of 1994, those 5 banks represent approximately 96 
percent of the total assets of the banking sector. 
 
From 1994 onwards, Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking reports the provincial 
data of savings and loans of rural credit cooperatives and of some selected trust and 
investment companies, financial companies, and other non-bank financial 
institutions.
9 Only the non-bank financial institutions that are considered to be large 
enough have their data included in the Almanac, whereas smaller institutions remain 
uncovered. This may introduce a reporting bias in that provinces with many small 
institutions may have an underestimated size of the non-banking sector. However such 
reporting bias should be taken care of by our province dummies in as far the reporting 
bias remains constant over our sample period within a province.   
 
We construct the financial development indicators of non-bank institutions from the 
annual provincial data of rural credit cooperatives and other reporting non-bank 
financial institutions. The computation of the non-bank concentration based on the 
aggregate data of Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking also induces some 
problems. While rural credit cooperatives, like other non-bank financial institutions, 
are isolated from each other, Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking reports the 
province level aggregate for all rural credit cooperatives jointly in every province. 
However in reality rural credit cooperatives are not “integrated” into one entity. 
Therefore, the degree of competition among non-bank financial institutions is 
estimated by measurement error, which is inevitable given our data limitations. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 provides summary statistics of our data. We present time averages for the 27 
provinces. Table 4 highlights that there is substantial variation between provinces. The 
highest average annual real per capita GDP growth rate equals 10.2 percent (Zhejiang 
province), while the lowest equals 5.7 percent (Yunnan province). The financial 
development indicators for China are relatively high compared to those for other 
                                                        
9 The data of urban credit cooperatives are also reported but not for every year. We therefore decided to exclude 
urban credit cooperatives from our sample. 
  18countries (see also Allen et al. (2005)). For example, the average ratios of Bank 
Deposit and Bank Credit across provinces are 0.843 and 0.683, while the average 
ratios of non-bank savings and loans to GDP across provinces are 0.141 and 0.109 
only. Similarly, Beijing on average has the highest values of both Bank Deposit and 
Bank Credit, while Shandong province on average has the lowest levels of Bank 
Deposit and Bank Credit. Non-bank financial institutions exhibit the lowest 
development in Qinghai province, while Shanxi on average has the greatest Non-bank 
Deposit and Guangdong enjoys the greatest Non-bank Credit. Both Bank Deposit and 
Bank Credit outweigh those of non-bank financial institutions. 
  
4.2.2 Empirical results 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 presents the results of different versions of equation (4). The left panel (5a,b 
and c) displays the results including the bank financial development indicators in the 
regression. We first discuss the results on our financial development indicators. We 
turn to the control variables after having introduced the results in Table 6. Bank 
Deposit and Bank Credit are significantly positively correlated with future economic 
growth. The middle panel (5d,e and f) presents the results where non-bank financial 
development indicators enter the regression. Only Non-bank Deposit is positively 
correlated with growth. While most of the Non-bank Credit is granted to the 
non-state-owned sector, those loans exhibit little correlation with future growth. The 
right panel (5g and h) shows the results for the regressions where both bank and 
non-bank indicators enter the specification. Including both Bank Credit and Non-bank 
Credit into one regression (5h) shows the robustness of the results. Both Bank Deposit 
and  Non-bank Deposit are significantly positively correlated with future growth 
(column 5g), which is in line with most finance and growth literature. However, Bank 
Concentration and Non-bank Concentration do not affect growth directly, suggesting 
that competition in banking markets does not affect growth. 
 
Bank and non-bank financial development indicators exhibit a significant different 
impact on growth. In particular, the coefficient of Bank Credit is statistically 
significant and higher even though bank loans are more focused on the state-owned 
  19sector. As a comparison, although non-bank loans are mostly extended to the 
non-state-owned sector, Non-bank Credit is largely irrelevant in explaining growth. 
This remarkable difference between bank and non-bank financial institutions suggests 
that the loans of the financial sector do not simply follow growth. On the contrary, it 
reveals that financial development plays an important role in promoting local Chinese 
economic growth, as banks compared to non-bank financial institutions have a wider 
geographical scope, are technologically more advanced, and may have been more 
affected by deregulatory financial reforms.
10
 
Does banking competition promote the impact of financial development? We deal 
with this question by running two additional regressions, and present the results in 
Table 6. The first regression in column 6a includes the interaction between Financial 
Concentration and Bank Credit (Financial Concentration x Bank Credit) as additional 
regressor. In the second regression presented in column 6b, we introduce the 
interaction between Bank Concentration and Bank Credit ( Bank Concentration x 
Bank Credit). The reasoning is that banks dominate the financial sector and the impact 
of Financial Concentration may mainly stem from Bank Concentration.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Column 6a shows that the interaction term Financial Concentration x Bank Credit is 
strongly negative, suggesting that more concentrated financial markets exhibit a lower 
growth rate for a given level of Bank Credit. In contrast, the coefficient on Bank 
Concentration x Bank Credit in column 6b is not significantly different from zero. 
Our results therefore suggest that although non-bank financial institutions seem to 
contribute little to local growth, their presence stimulates the competitiveness of the 
financial sector. That is the impact of Bank Credit in the provinces where the financial 
markets are less concentrated is much more pronounced.   
 
We now turn to the control variables. The results in Tables 5 and 6 reveal that neither 
FDI nor Investment are having a significant impact on growth. This result may stem 
from the inclusion of province fixed effects. Therefore, FDI and Investment may not 
                                                        
10 The series of financial reforms and deregulations are reported in Table a2 in Appendix. 
  20exhibit sufficient time-series variation to become significant. Table 6 reveals that also 
the per capita capital stock growth is not statistically significant. An explanation for 
this is that people may move easier across provinces within a country than to move 
across countries. Hence an empirical application using local data of a country may 
suffer from the problem that the provincial population is quite unstable over time. 
Therefore, the insignificance of the coefficient of per capita capital stock growth may 
be due to the fluctuation of local population. We therefore test whether the growth of 
aggregate capital stock is correlated with aggregate economic growth.   
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Table 7 presents the results of regressing provincial aggregate GDP growth on the 
growth of the aggregate capital stock and financial development indicators. The 
aggregate capital stock growth is significant and positive. More importantly, Bank 
Credit keeps it positive sign. However, Bank Deposit now is only marginally 
significant in the first regression, and Non-bank Deposit becomes insignificant. 
 
4.3 Robustness tests: endogeneity 
 
Are our results driven by reserve causality? That is, does the expectation of future 
growth prospects imply greater financial development? If this were true, high 
economic growth provinces should also exhibit high growth rates of financial 
development. We investigate this issue in several ways. First, we select the 13 fastest 
growing provinces in terms of economic growth. We do find, however, that only 6 of 
them are in the top 13 of fastest growing Bank Deposit or Bank Credit provinces. 
Therefore, high growth provinces are not more likely to be provinces that have a high 
growth rate of financial development.   
 
Second, directly controlling for endogeneity is also possible when employing the 
dynamic system GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). The 
dynamic panel model requires the lagged dependent variable to enter to right-hand 
side of the regression. For example, regression (4) can be extended to a dynamic panel 
regression as follows,     
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A system estimator jointly estimates the regression in levels (5) and the regression in 
differences (6). In order to correct for endogeneity, Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest 
employing lagged first differences of the explanatory variables as instruments for the 
equation in levels (5) and the lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as 
instruments for the equation in differences (6). The crucial assumptions therefore are 
that the lagged differences of variables are good instruments for explaining 
subsequent levels and the lagged levels of variables are good instruments for 
explaining subsequent first differences. Rejection of the Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions at 5% level however questions the validity of those 
instruments. It is also necessary to test whether the error term of regression (6), 
,, it it 1 ε ε − − , is second-order serially autocorrelated. Accepting the null hypothesis of 
no second-order serial autocorrelation supports the assumption of the moment 
condition of (6). 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Table 8 reports the impact of financial development on economic growth when using 
the dynamic system GMM estimator. Bank loans significantly spur future economic 
growth, both economically and statistically. For example, if Shandong, the province 
now receiving the least bank credit enjoyed as much bank credit as Beijing, where the 
most bank credit is extended, ceteris paribus, Shandong’s growth rate would increase 
approximately 8 percent per year, which is huge. Column 8h displays the results when 
we include Bank Credit and Non-bank Credit in one regression. Again, only the 
impact of Bank Credit appears to be positive and significant. Bank Deposit does not 
show any significant impact. The impact of Non-bank Deposit appears to be different 
in column 8d and column 8g, questioning the robustness of the effect of non-bank 
  22loan size on growth. The coefficients of Bank Concentration and Non-bank 
Concentration are not significant. The fact that the null hypotheses of both the Sargan 
test and the second-order serial autocorrelation tests cannot be rejected at the 5 
percent level approves the validity of the results of dynamic panel regressions
11. In 
general, the results reported by Table 8 confirm those of Table 5. 
  
We also employ the dynamic system GMM estimator when including the interaction 
item between concentration and financial development (results are reported in Table 





Is the finance-growth nexus at work in an economy exhibiting a high growth rate? In 
this paper we provide empirical evidence on the impact of financial development on 
the growth of Chinese provinces over the recent period 1995-2003. Exploiting within 
variation on 27 provinces, we are able to more adequately control for institutional, 
legal and cultural factors that may commonly affect the Chinese financial system. We 
find that the finance-growth nexus also applies to the recent economic growth of 
Chinese provinces. 
  
But which financial institutions’ development contributes to the Chinese 
finance-growth nexus? We look at the impact of two types – “banks” and “non-bank 
financial institutions”. The reasoning to distinguish those two types is that banks, 
relative to non-bank financial institutions, have a wider geographical scope, are larger, 
and are often more hierarchically organized. Bank branches are also well integrated 
and may benefit from centrally developed technology and expert credit systems.   
 
We find that provinces with a more financially developed banking sector enjoy a 
statistically and economically significantly higher local economic growth
12. In 
                                                        
11 The null of the Sargan test of the regression reported in column 6f cannot be rejected at 5% but can still be 
rejected at 10%.   
12 As the two surveys in Appendix document, the Chinese banks seem to be less prone to grant loans when firms 
are in the starting-up stage but become the most important loan providers once the firms survive and become larger. 
Hence the Chinese banks may discriminate the two different channels modeled by King and Levine (1993b), as 
illustrated in Figure 4. Specifically, banks are more likely to drop the channel of financing potential entrepreneurs 
  23contrast, even though non-bank financial institutions focus more on the 
non-state-owned sector, we still find that provinces with a more developed non-bank 
financial sector show no different growth rate than provinces with a little developed 
non-bank financial sector. We also find that the impact on growth of banking 
development is more pronounced in provinces with a less concentrated financial 
sector, showing that competition pronounces the finance-growth nexus. In particular 
competition from non-bank financial institutions seems important. 
 
In general, our findings challenge the view that China is a counterexample to the 
current findings in the finance-growth literature. Our focus on a recent time period 
and the difference between banks and non-bank financial institutions shows that the 











                                                                                                                                                               
but adopt the channel of evaluating and financing intermediate goods monopoly. 
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Table 1: Operating costs of different Chinese financial institutions 
 
 
Institutions  Operating Costs Ratio  Sample Period  Average Ratio 
Industrial and commercial Bank of China*  0.010 1996-2003 




Operating costs ratio= operating costs/total assets 
* Source: Bankscope 
** Source: Xie, P., 2001, Zhongguo nongcun xinyongshe tizhi gaige de zhenglun (The system reform of China’s rural credit cooperatives), Financial Research, 2001(1). 
Banks 
Bank of Communications*  0.015 1996-2003 
 
0.011 
Rural Credit Cooperatives**  0.019 1998-1999 
Heilongjiang International Trust & Investment Corp.*  0.030 1997-1998 
Jiangsu International Trust & Investment Corp.*  0.007 1996-1997 
Shanghai AJ Trust & Investment Co, Ltd*  0.014 1996-2002 
Shanghai Associated Finance Co.*  0.008 1996-1997 
Shanghai International Trust & Investment Corp.*  0.022 2000-2002 













0.128 1996-1999    Zhejiang International Trust & Investment Corp.* 
 
0.030 
  31 Table 2: Financial risk comparison between banks and non-bank institutions 
 
Institutions Financial  Risk 
Nonperforming Loan Ratio*   
Name  2000 2001  2002  2003 
ICBC  0.334 0.298  0.257  0.213 
BOC  0.272 0.275  0.225  0.181 




ABC  0.468 0.421  0.381  0.321 
 
 
Rural Credit Cooperatives 
Average nonperforming loan ratio was around 0.5 by the end of 2003. In some 







  Nonperforming Loan ratio is unreported but expected to be high. The bankruptcy of 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company (GITIC) in 1998 is an example. 
The Chinese government often decides to close the financially bankrupt Trust and 
Investment Companies.   
 
Trust and Investment 
Companies 
The total number of Trust and Investment companies shrank from 339 (by 1990) to 244 




* Source:    Sun, L., 2003,The Fragility in China’s Financial Systems, Finance and Trade Economics (Chinese), 268: 5-12 
**Source：Zhang, Q., 2003, Zhongguo Nongcun Jinrong Xianzhang Yu Zhengce Fengxi (Analysis of the Chinese Rural Finanical System), Report for Asian Development 
Bank, 2003 
*** Source: Xie, P., 1998, Zhongguo Fei Yinhang Jinrong Jigou Yanjiu ( A Study of the Chinese Non-bank Financial Institutions),  Economcs and Finance, 1998 (3), (4), 
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Table 3: Composition of Short-term loan portfolio of the Chinese financial institutions: 1994-2002 
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-0.091  0.156  0.177 












Source: China Credit Yearbook (Volume I) 
 
 










Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
real GDP per capita growth rate  27 .077 .013  .057  .102 
real capital stock per capita growth rate  27 .114 .020  .072  .145 
Bank Deposit (bank savings to GDP)  27 .843 .467  .477  2.936 
Bank Credit (bank loans to GDP)  27 .683 .224  .402  1.223 
Bank Concentration (HHI based on bank deposit market shares)  27 .265 .029  .222  .353 
Non-bank Deposit (non-bank savings to GDP)  27 .141 .053  .049  .268 
Non-bank Credit (non-bank loans to GDP)  27 .109 .041  .038  .224 
Non-bank Concentration (HHI based on non-bank deposit market shares)  27 .726 .094  .549  .850 
Financial Concentration (HHI based on the whole deposit market shares)  27 .207 .035  .137  .358 
Investment (Investment to GDP)  27 .455  .683  .087  .337 







Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1995-2003) 






 Table 5: Finance and real per capita GDP growth in Chinese provinces: 1995-2003 
Fixed effects regressions, within estimator 
 
 
   Dependent  variable:  Real Per Capita GDP Growth  
 
     regressors 








































































    
















































              
Obs  242  242  242 242 242 242  242  242 





* indicates significance at 10% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
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Table 6:    Finance and real per capita GDP growth in Chinese provinces (1995-2003):   
the impact of concentration 
Fixed effects regressions, within estimator 
 
   Dependent  variable:  Real Per Capita GDP Growth  
 
 










































    
Obs  242 242 





* indicates significance at 10% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
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Table 7: Finance and aggregate real GDP growth in Chinese province ( 1995-2003): 
aggregate capital stock growth 
Fixed effects regressions, within estimator 
 
 
 Dependent  variable:  Aggregate Real GDP Growth  
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* indicates significance at 10% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
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Table 8:    Finance and real per capita GDP growth in Chinese provinces: 1995-2003 
Dynamic panel regressions, system GMM estimator 
 
  Dependent  variable:  Real Per Capita GDP Growth  
 
    
Regressors 
































































































































          
Obs  215 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
Sargan  Test  .297 .321 .226 .200 .390  .051*  .282 .419 
AR(2)  Test  .290 .372 .241 .355 .218 .332 .299 .354 
 
* indicates significance at 10% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
p-value is reported between brackets 
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Table 9:    Finance and real per capita GDP growth in Chinese provinces (1995-2003):   
the impact of concentration 
Dynamic panel regressions, system GMM estimator 
 
   Dependent  variable:  Real Per Capita GDP Growth  
 
 












































    
Obs  215 215 
. 460 . 458  Sargan Test 





* indicates significance at 10% level 
** indicates significance at 5% level 
*** indicates significance at 1% level 






  39Appendix  
Table a1: The introduction to the main Chinese financial institutions 
 
* They are classified as non-bank financial institutions, according to Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking.  
Some Chinese researchers are willing to exclude credit cooperatives from non-bank financial institutions because 
those cooperatives are functionally closer to commercial banks. In our study, we follow the classification of 
Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking. 
Name Functions 
 
People’s Bank of China 
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) is China’s central bank, which 
formulates and implements monetary policy. 
 
 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was officially launched on 
April 28, 2003, to take over the supervisory role of the PBOC. It regulates 
and supervises banks, asset management companies, trust and investment 
companies as well as other deposit-taking financial institutions. 
 
 
Stated-owned commercial banks  
The four Stated-owned banks were established in the mid-1980s and 
transformed into commercial banks in 1994. The “big four” include:  the 
Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC).       
  The three policy banks were established in 1994 to take over the 
government-directed spending functions of the four state-owned 
commercial banks. The three policy banks are: the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB), 
and the Export-Import Bank of China (Chexim) 
 
Policy banks  
 
 
National and regional commercial banks were mostly established by key 
state entities. China Minsheng Banking Corp. is the first publicly traded 
private bank. Bank of Communications is the biggest bank among all those 
banks. Although those banks are much smaller than the four state-owned 
banks, they have a much lower ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs).   
National and regional commercial 
banks  
 
  There are two types of credit cooperatives: rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) 
and urban credit cooperatives (UCCs). Both of them are local financial 
institutions and aimed to extend loans for local economic activities. They 
are functionally close to commercial banks. 
Credit cooperatives* 
  Trust and investment companies (TICs) are engaged in various forms of 
merchant and investment banking activities. They take deposits from 
inter-bank markets. Except for few national TICs, most of them were 
established by government agencies and provincial authorities and are 
localized.  
Trust and investment companies* 
 
Financial companies* 
Financial companies belong to state entities. They are only allowed to take 
deposits from and grant loans to entities. 
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The State Council approved a regulation on establishment of delegations of 
foreign banks and financial institutions in Beijing and special economic zones 
198504  The State Council approved a regulation on establishment of branches of foreign 
banks and of joint venture banks in special economic zones 
198601  PBOC allowed Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) to provide personal checks for the 
individual-owned companies in 7 provinces/cities. 
198604  PBOC introduced a regulation on controlling the establishment of trust and 
investment companies (TICs); The regulation strictly forbids private-owned TICs. 
198607  PBOC introduced a regulation requiring a re-evaluation process for existing urban 
credit cooperatives (UCCs) in order to control the fast growth of UCCs. UCCs 
were not allowed to enter the county level market. 
199102  PBOC introduced credit rating system in ABC and requested ABC to grant loans 
according to a company’s creditworthiness.     
199207  PBOC decided to intervene in the management of non-bank financial institutions 
by assigning officials to those institutions. 
199400  The Chinese government converted four "specialized" banks into "commercial" 
banks by transferring their responsibilities for making noncommercial loans to 
three newly established "policy" banks. The first China's central and commercial 
banking laws was passed to allowed new, non-state-owned banks to set up 
business. 
199400  PBOC liberalized the interest rates for the four stated-owned commercial banks 
within bounds (upper bounder 20%, lower bounder 10% respect to the fixed 
interest rate set by PBOC). 
199507  A new commercial bank law went into effect.  
199511  China launched its first national inter-bank market linking 30 short-term credit 
offices across China into a single computer network.  
199608  PBOC overtook ABC in supervision RCCs. 
199600  China Minsheng Banking Corp., the nation’s first publicly traded private bank, 
was established. 
199800  PBOC abolished the “credit plan” requirement for commercial banks. Credit risk 
control becomes one of the most important topics. 
199808  TICs and other financial companies were regulated.  The number of those 
financial institutions shrank. 
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Table a2 (continued): Financial reforms in China 
 
Date Events 
199907  (Controls on credit operations) Some controls on Renminbi (RMB) loans to 
foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) under foreign exchange liens or guarantees 
were eased. 
199900  Four asset management companies established to offload $169 billion in 
nonperforming loans from the four state-owned banks. 
200007  A personal credit rating system was launched in Shanghai to assess consumer 
credit risk and set ratings standards. This helps in developing China’s consumer 
credit industry, and increases bank loans to individuals. 
200100  During the third quarter, the government crackdown illegal bank loans to stock 
market speculators and its practice of selling of shares to finance pension 
obligations. 
200100  China becomes a member of the World Trade Organization; commits to opening 
up its financial services industry on equal terms to foreign banks by 2006. 
200100  HSBC Holdings becomes the first foreign bank to buy a stake in a mainland 
Chinese bank. 
200201  The regulations governing foreign banks and financial institutions were issued by 
the PBOC and were to take effect on 1 February, replacing the five sets of 
regulations in force since 1996. 
200401  The Chinese government has dipped into its US$400bn foreign exchange reserves 
in order to recapitalize two of the 'Big Four' state-owned banks, in a move to 
accelerate reform in the country's ailing financial sector. 
 
200405  Liu Mingkang, head of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, said that 
China's banks should sue the firms and people whose bad debts are destabilizing 
the banking system. 
200406 
 
China's banking regulator has ordered tighter scrutiny of bank lending as part of a 
government campaign against reckless investment. 
 
Source: Bekaert, G., and Harvey, C. R., Chronology of Economic, Political and Financial Events 
in Emerging Markets: China. http://www.duke.edu/~charvey/Country_risk/couindex.htm
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A survey carried out by People’s Bank of China in October, 2002, shows that 47.7% of the total 
bank loans had been extended to the non-state-owned sector during the first 9 months in 2002. 
This survey covers 184 cities from 30 provinces of China, 10,804 non-state-owned enterprises and 
2,633 banks (branches) and non-bank financial institutions.   
 
Satisfaction ratios reported by banks (2002.1-2002.9) 
 
Institutions  Loans required (Billion RMB)  Satisfaction ratio 
State-owned banks  1,138.9 84.1% 
National and regional banks  596.24 80.9% 
City commercial banks*  149.68 84.5% 
Foreign banks  122.66 75.4% 
Non-bank financial institutions  208.95 85.5% 
*transformed from urban credit cooperatives 
 
The satisfaction ratio varies among different types of applicants. For example, the satisfaction 
ratio of large non-state-owned enterprises is 85% while that of small and medium non-state-owned 
enterprises is only 69.5%. Moreover, ownership also matters for the satisfaction ratio. For instance, 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan funded enterprises have a satisfaction ratio of 88.6%, which is the 
highest among all kinds of enterprises. Private enterprises, on the contrary, have the lowest 
satisfaction ratio of 73.8%. 
 








Private-lending  Bonds FDI  Stock 
markets  loans 
35.7% 24.7%  17.4%  10.7%  8.2%  2.8%  0.6% 
 







Another survey carried out by People’s Bank of China in 2002 shows that after the deregulation of 
interest rate discrimination, bank loans become the most important sources for SMEs in Weizhou 
city, whose economic growth is typically driven by the private sector. 
This survey covers 190 SMEs and 13 banks and credit cooperatives in Wenzhou. The survey 
  43shows that 61% of the debts of the SMEs were bank loans at 2002.   
78% of the SMEs in the survey answered they would first go for bank loans (or credit cooperative 
loans) when needing external financing. The satisfaction ratio still varies between small and 
medium sized enterprises. For example, the satisfaction ratio of loans reported by medium sized 
enterprises is 72.7% while that reported by small sized enterprises is only 60.5%. 
 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2003) 
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